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W
ith few exceptions, the Supreme Court has rejected arguments 
that the Constitution guarantees affirmative rights that cost 
public resources and many Justices express concern that doing so would 
produce a slippery slope, without clear lines to divide constitutionally 
guaranteed rights from others. Against this backdrop, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s opinion in M. L. B. v. S. L. J.—holding that a state may 
not deny an indigent parent the chance to appeal judicial termination 
of her parental rights by requiring payment to prepare the trial court 
record—is a work of great craftsmanship as well as a just and compas-
sionate decision.
No Heightened Scrutiny Regarding  
Discrimination Against the Poor
The United States Constitution does not accord rights to government 
services or subsidies with extremely limited exceptions: the state must 
supply counsel for individuals facing imprisonment as a criminal sanc-
tion (Gideon v. Wainwright); a state cannot deny free trial transcripts 
to indigent criminal defendants who were seeking appellate review of 
their convictions (Griffin v. Illinois); nor may a state impose a poll tax 
effectively barring those who cannot pay from state and local elections 
(Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections).4 When the Supreme Court re-
jected in 97 the claim that discrimination against the poor deserves 
heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment,5 it was in fact 
affirming a prior decision to use rational basis review in cases challenging 8
“economics and social welfare” laws.6 A rational basis could be supplied 
by a state’s desire to save costs. That is what Mississippi asserted when a 
woman, known to the Court as M. L. B., sought to appeal a decree ter-
minating her parental rights to two minor children but faced the barrier 
of an estimated $2,352.36 fee for preparing the record required for the 
appeal. Having no ability to pay that fee, the appeal was dismissed.
  Not only did M. L. B. face the general rule of no constitutional right 
to a free transcript in a noncriminal matter; there was no plausible con-
stitutional claim of a right to an appeal at all. And the Court had al-
ready rejected the argument that termination of parental rights posed 
at least as serious a deprivation as incarceration when a mother sought 
court-appointed counsel. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of 
Durham County, the Court held that indigent parents have no right to a 
government-appointed lawyer when facing termination of parental rights 
proceedings.7 There, the Court did indicate that a due process analysis 
in individual cases could support appointment of counsel in a particular 
case where important to avoid likely error, but the Court went on to find 
no such need in Mrs. Lassiter’s case, despite multiple indications of Mrs. 
Lassiter’s inability to present her case.8 In a noncriminal matter with no 
guaranteed appeal or counsel, how could M. L. B. persuade the Court 
that the Constitution called for a right to preparation of the trial record 
that would cost the state $,5.6 to provide?
Building Access Out of Puzzle Pieces
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion proceeds carefully and without frontal chal-
lenges to the constraining precedents. It treats as unquestioned the guide-
posts that a state need not establish avenues for appellate review; nor must 
a state make counsel available in any cases but those where incarceration 
is at stake. Without disturbing these precedents, the opinion nonetheless 
emphasizes that the Court had already prohibited: “‘making access to 
appellate processes from even [the State’s] most inferior courts depend 
upon the [convicted] defendant’s ability to pay’” in Mayer v. Chicago.9 9
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg stressed that in facing criminal fines, defen-
dant Mayer—like M. L. B.—did not face a risk of incarceration.0
  Still adhering to the general rule that the Constitution mandates no 
provision of government benefits, the opinion nonetheless identified 
precedents recognizing the special situation of State-controlled determi-
nation of family status. Because a State “could not deny a divorce to 
a married couple based on their inability to pay approximately $60 in 
court costs,” and a State “must pay for blood grouping tests sought by 
an indigent defendant to enable him to contest a paternity suit,” there 
was already “a narrow category of civil cases in which the State must 
provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party’s ability 
to pay court fees.” Reviewing other contexts in which claims of access 
failed, the opinion concludes, “[T]ellingly, the Court has consistently set 
apart from the mine run of cases those involving State controls or intru-
sions on family relationships.”4
  Aligning M. L. B.’s case with not only access-to-court but other deci-
sions recognizing the significance of family relationships,5 the opinion 
dodges efforts to bar relief for M.L.B. on the grounds that hers is a civil, 
not criminal, case and that she does not face incarceration. Here, the 
Court’s previous conclusion that forced dissolution of her parental rights 
involves interests “‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’”6 In the 
hierarchy of interests, M. L. B.’s concerns are even more weighty because 
she faces not simply “loss of custody, which does not sever the parent 
child bond,” but “parental status termination, which is ‘irretrievabl[y] 
destructi[ve] of the most fundamental family relationship.’”7 Here the 
opinion smartly relied on a procedural due process decision requiring a 
State to demonstrate evidence under the heightened “clear and convinc-
ing” burden of proof before terminating parental rights.8 The Court’s 
strong statements of the private interests at stake there called for careful 
judicial proceedings, but Justice Ginsburg emphasized how M.L.B. had 
the same strong private interests.
  Those strong private interests—“commanding,” and “far more precious 
than any property right”9—could supply the basis for waiving record 0
preparation fees at least as well as the risk of multiple fines supplied a basis 
for a right to a transcript to enable an appeal by individuals facing nei-
ther incarceration nor the stigma of a felony conviction. Weightier than 
the criminal fines at issue when the Court required waiver of transcript 
costs in Mayer, M. L. B.’s interests involve “the most fundamental family 
relationship.”0 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion points to multiple decisions as 
“acknowledging the primacy of the parent child relationship.” Toward the 
end of the opinion, the interests at stake are described this way: “‘[T]ermi-
nation adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State ‘to destroy 
permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship.’” No formal 
category distinguishing civil and criminal nor functional category distin-
guishing jeopardy of incarceration from other liberties can stand in the way 
of recognizing M. L. B.’s precious interests at the mercy of State power.
  And Mississippi’s desire to save money could not outweigh these sig-
nificant family interests. If the State’s “pocketbook interest in advance 
payment for a transcript” was unimpressive as a reason to bar appeal of a 
conviction to someone who faced only fines, not incarceration, it surely 
is not sufficient to bar appeal on similar grounds for a mother facing the 
permanent end of her “‘most fundamental family relationship.’”4 Even 
the financial interest is paltry, since the State had faced only a dozen ap-
peals on the merits following parental rights termination decisions.5
  All of these steps in the analysis are made without specifying whether the 
analysis depends on Due Process or Equal Protection. Given the limita-
tions of the precedents under both doctrines, noted pointedly by the dis-
senting opinion,6 that is quite a feat. Despite the dissent’s objection that 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion fails sufficiently to confine the reach of its rea-
soning, Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, complimented Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s opinion for its “most careful and comprehensive recitation 
of the precedents.”7 While confining his endorsement to the due process 
elements of the analysis, Justice Kennedy further commends Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion for the Court because it “well describes the fundamental 
interests the petitioner has in ensuring that the order which terminated all 
her parental ties was based upon a fair assessment of the facts and the law.”8
Subtle Rhetoric
Justice Ginsburg announces no broad or bold statements of constitu-
tional guarantees; instead, her opinion pieces together exceptions, and 
threads a needle, connecting M. L. B.’s situation to the exceptional right 
to fee waiver for appeals from criminal convictions and to the recognition 
of weighty family interests in waiving fees for divorce and paternity tests 
and in requiring heightened burden of proof before a State could termi-
nate parental rights. Almost every sentence depends in critical portions 
on language quoted from prior opinions. It is as if the opinion is written 
entirely through cut-and-pasted quotations, defying any charge of bold 
expansion of constitutional guarantees.
  Yet the words that are Justice Ginsburg’s own make a world of differ-
ence. From the opinion’s first sentence, the opinion lays out the stakes: 
M. L. B.’s parental rights were “forever terminated” with only the appeal 
at issue as her remaining hope.9 Later, the opinion explains, the Court 
approaches “M. L. B.’s petition mindful of the gravity of the sanction im-
posed on her.”0 It is that tone, a kind of hushed awareness of the gravity 
of the situation, that imbues the opinion with integrity and subtle shifts 
in emphasis.
  Consider the question before the Court. Justice Ginsburg states it at 
the start as it was framed by M. L. B.:
  “May a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial 
court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent’s abil-
ity to pay record preparation fees?” Demonstrating the subtlety of her 
argumentation, the question is restated later in the opinion as:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require Mississippi to accord M. L. 
B. access to an appeal available but for her inability to advance re-
quired costs before she is forever branded unfit for affiliation with her 
children?
  Note what has changed: ) the focus on Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion has shifted to simply what does the Fourteenth Amendment require; 
) the appeal conditioned on record preparation fees is now recast as 
an appeal available but for inability to pay costs; and ) termination of 
parental rights is reread as permanent branding of a mother as unfit to 
affiliate with her children. Each of these shifts is well supported by the 
close reasoning in the paragraphs between the opening statement and 
later restatement. By the time the question is restated, the conclusion 
seems nearly assured.
Halting the Objections
Nearly assured, that is, for two nagging objections remain. Justice Thom-
as’s dissent warns that the Court’s view opens the floodgates to further de-
mands for free assistance by civil appellants in other kinds of cases, and 
also objects that the key precedents either do not support the Court’s con-
clusion or should be rejected.4 While Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion 
implies a restriction of the Court’s decision to family matters, the analysis 
presented by Justice Ginsburg for the Court leaves open applications to 
further circumstances. Rather than a weakness, as claimed by the dissent-
ers, this feature is commendable, for Justice Ginsburg’s analysis provides 
reasons—seeing enormous stakes for an individual weigh heavily against 
financial concern of the State—which if duplicated in another context 
should prevent an arbitrary line barring access to appeal.
  The second objection remains a vigorous line of attack by members of 
the Court who seek to curb Equal Protection doctrine. Justice Thomas 
argues that only demonstrations of intentional discrimination should 
warrant constitutional solicitude and hence asserts no defect in a neutral 
rule of general applicability—like a requirement that litigants pay for re-
cord preparation prior to an appeal.5 On this reasoning, relying on Wash-
ington v. Davis,6 the dissent would insulate any general fee requirement 
from challenge by impoverished individuals even if such a requirement 
effectively bars access to court. Indeed, this line of reasoning would lead 
to reversing decisions guaranteeing access to court, access to counsel, and 
access to the ballot box. The dissenters are right to find a tension between 
the intentional discrimination requirement of Washington v. Davis and 
many Equal Protection precedents. By securing the endorsement of the 
Court, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. places a boulder in 
the path of the dissent’s campaign to extend Washington v. Davis—and 
undoes the dissent’s claims that only old precedents diverge in allowing 
protection against the impact of neutral rules on the poor.
  The United States remains one of a handful of U.N. member states 
that have not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. The treaty was signed by President Jimmy Carter 
in 977, but the nation has taken no steps toward ratification. Ours is 
widely understood to be a Constitution of negative, not positive, liber-
ties. It is also sadly often a place where the poor are left without support 
or access to food, shelter, and security. A rising dependence by govern-
ment agencies on user fees and other charges and a trend toward privatiz-
ing what once had been public programs put in jeopardy participation by 
low-income people in the central institutions of society. In this context, 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in M. L. B. v. S. L. J. is truly 
extraordinary. And it ensures that no parents will be locked out of judicial 
review of a decision to forever end legal relationships with their children 
simply because they cannot pay a court fee.
m
Endnotes
	  Thanks to Lynnette Miner for fine and timely editorial assistance.
	  7 U.S. 5, 9 (96).
	  5 U.S. , 9 (956).
	4  8 U.S. 66, 666 (966).
	5  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4 U.S. , 8 (97)(find-
ing no basis for applying suspect classification or fundamental in-
terest analysis to a challenge to reliance on local property taxes to 
support public education).4
	6  Dandridge v. Williams, 97 U.S. 47 (970) (applying rational basis 
review to uphold a cap on welfare benefits regardless of family size). 
The Court also rejected the claim of an Equal Protection Clause vio-
lation when a federal program denied funding for abortion while 
paying for childbirth and related medical care costs. Maher v. Roe, 
4 U.S. 464, 470 (977).
	7  45 U.S. 8,  (98).
	8  See id., at 44-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
	9  M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 59 U.S. 0 (996) (quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 
404 U.S. 89, 97 (97)).
	 0  Id. at -.
	   59 U.S., at  (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 40 U.S. 7 (97)).
	   Id. (citing Little v. Streater, 45 U.S. , -7 (98)).
	   Id. at 0.
	 4  Id. at 6.
	 5  59 U.S. at 6 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 4 U.S. 494 (977), 
Turner v. Safley, 48 U.S. 78 (987), Zablocki v. Redhail, 44 U.S. 74 
(978), Loving v. Virginia, 88 U.S.  (967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex 
rel. Williamson, 6 U.S. 55 (94); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 68 
U.S. 50 (95), Meyer v. Nebraska, 6 U.S. 90 (9); Lassiter v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 45 U.S. 8 (98); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (98)).
	 6  59 U.S. at  (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756).
	 7  Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 75).
	 8  455 U.S. 745, 748 (98).
	 9  59 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59 (citing Las-
siter, 45 U.S. at 7)).
	 0  Id. at .
	   Id. at 0.
	   Id. (quoting Rivera v. Minnich, 48 U.S. 574, 580 (987)).
	   Id. at -.
	 4  Id. at .
	 5  Id. at .
	 6  59 U.S. at 0-9	(Thomas, J., dissenting).
	 7  Id. at 8	(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
	 8  Id. at 9.5
	 9  Id. at 06.
	 0  Id. at 0.
	   Id. at 07.
	   Id. at 9.
	   Id. at 9-0 (Thomas, J., dissenting): “I do not think, however, that 
the newfound constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals 
can be effectively restricted to this case. The inevitable consequence 
will be greater demands on the States to provide free assistance to 
would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases involving interests 
that cannot, based on the test established by the majority, be distin-
guished from the admittedly important interest at issue here.”
	 4  Id. at 0-44.
	 5  Id. at -9.
	 6  46 U.S. 9 (976) (rejecting a disparate impact theory of the Equal 
Protection Clause altogether).